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Abstract
Cognitive philosophy in recent years has made conversation central to the experience
of emotion: we recognise emotions in dialogue.What lesson can be drawn from this for
understanding Erasmus’ Colloquies? This work has often been rifled for its treatment
of ideas and opinions, but it also offers a complex and highly imaginative treatment
of conversation, originating as rhetorical exercises in De copia. This essay reconfigures
the Colloquies in such terms, especially those involving female interlocutors, drawing
on the riches of ancient interest in conversation in Plato, Cicero and Quintilian, and
also on the vogue for dialogue in Renaissance Italy fromLeonardo Bruni to Castiglione.
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…
Le plus fructueux et naturel exercice de nostre esprit, c’est à mon
gré la conference. J’en trouve l’usage plus doux que d’aucune autre
action de nostre vie.1
michel de montaigne, ‘De l’art de conferer’, Essais, iii.8
∵
1 Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. P. Villey and V.-L. Saulnier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2004), p. 922.
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Conversation, Montaigne avers, is the most natural function of the human
spirit. A faculty of speaking is the key to the art of living: so much so that he
would sooner give up the sense of sight than hearing or speech. Montaigne
means by ‘la conference’, above all, the exercise of spirited debate: he wants
someone to disagree with. The mind is invigorated by communication with
other vigorous minds. Cicero in De finibus is cited by Montaigne in approv-
ing affirmation: Neque enim disputari sine reprehensione potest. ‘There can be
no debate without contradiction’, it appears; although it is also worth noting
that Montaigne fails to quote the remainder of Cicero’s sentence: ‘it is equally
impossible to debate properly with ill-temper or obstinacy’.2
This passage in De finibus is, of course, well known to Erasmus, who agreed
with the latter sentiment as much if not more than with the first. The fine line
between controversy and decorum, between wit and discord, is one of the first
principles of Erasmus in politics or religion, or in the moral life, or at dinner
parties. Conversation is thus an art of agreement as well as disagreement, for
which Cicero is once again the champion. Cicero’s nemesis Julius Caesar ‘sur-
passed them all’ as an orator, he says, because even at the bar he would use his
conversational style (sermone) ‘to defeat other advocates with their elaborate
orations’.3 Cicero goes on in De officiis to say that conversation:
should be easy and not in the least dogmatic; it should have the spice of
wit. And the one who engages in conversation should not debar others
from participating in it, as if he were entering upon a private monopoly;
but, as in other things, so in a general conversation (in sermone communi)
he should think it not unfair for each to have his turn.
For Montaigne in particular, as for the sixteenth century in general, and for
some time after, ‘l’ art de conferer’ was embodied in the Familiaria Colloquia
of Erasmus. This was first published in November 1518, by Johannes Froben, in
an unauthorized octavo of eighty pages, of about a dozen exercises in polite
conversation.4 In March 1519, Erasmus consented to a revised version by Dirk
Martens. By March 1522, as it found definitive form, the book had been reis-
sued around thirty times, in copies printed in Paris, Leipzig, Antwerp, Vienna,
Kraków, Mainz, Augsburg, Cologne, and Strasbourg, as well as Basel and Lou-
vain.5 The number of the colloquies, and the work’s ambition, grew and grew
2 Cicero, De finibus, 1.8.28.
3 Cicero, De officiis, 1.37.133.
4 Familiarium colloquiorum formulae (Basel: Johannes Froben, 1518).
5 Craig R. Thompson, ‘Introduction’, in cwe 39: xxiv.
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until the edition by Hieronymus Froben and Nicolaus Episcopius in 1533.6 By
now a full-scale book of dialogues, this edition formed the basis for the posthu-
mous Opera omnia, comprising sixty-one model cases of human interaction in
speech.
In the prefatory letter to theMarch 1519 edition, Erasmus describes the work
as consisting of ‘phrases useful in daily intercourse and…conversation over the
dinner-table’.7 Yet in his apology ‘To the reader’ dated 21May 1526, appended to
most editions as a short treatise, De utilitate colloquiorum, Erasmus says little
about the art of conversation, either in theory or practice. Instead, pursued by
‘slander’, he regrets how these days ‘it is not safe to publish any book except
under armed guard’.8 Conversation, it seems, follows its own law of entropy,
and by now (as in manymatters), Erasmus associated it with the controversies
and reprehensions the colloquies had subsequently run into. This reflects the
turbulence of the times, and especially of the Luther affair. The faculty of the-
ology in Paris in 1526 identified 69 passages in the book which were subject to
error or liable to corrupt the young, and in 1528 the faculties of arts, canon law
andmedicine lumbered in.9 Erasmus’ statements onmonks, on pilgrimages, or
celibacy, or fasting, exposed him to censure: but also, perhaps, the style of the
work itself caused trouble, moulded on Horace’s Satires, and conceived (as he
remarked in 1519) as ‘gossip by the fireside after supper’. The book reflects what
we feel in ‘our off moments, in our cups, in love, or in anger’.10 Conversation is
always like that.Whatever wemeant to say, however we understood each other
while we were speaking, may be overtaken by mutual misunderstanding. This
is, perhaps, an allegory for the intersubjective experience of emotion. Miscom-
munication, upset, or anxiety, are as much a part of the history of emotion as
communication, sympathy, or harmony. ‘Our feelings belong to oneworld’, says
Proust; ‘our ability to name things and our thoughts to another; we can estab-
lish a concordance between the two, but not bridge the gap’.11
This, indeed, has been the philosophical justification for the dialogue form
since ancient times. Socrates uses the dialectic of conversation to enable us to
pursue truth, winnowing off false opinions or glib insights on the way. Some
6 asd i-3: 771–774 conveniently sets out the progress in contents of the early editions.
7 Ep. 909 cwe lines 14–15.
8 ‘The Usefulness of the Colloquies’, cwe 40: 1097.
9 Craig R. Thompson, Headnote to De utiliitate, in cwe 40: 1096.
10 Ep. 909 cwe lines 71–72.
11 Marcel Proust,TheGuermantesWay, trans.MarkTreharne (London: PenguinBooks), p. 47.
‘Nous sentons dans un monde, nous pensons, nous nommons dans un autre, nous pou-
vons entre les deux établir une concordancemais non combler l’ intervalle’; À la recherche
du temps perdu, ed. Jean-Yves Tadié, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), ii.349.
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readers, initially, perhaps, assume that Socrates always speaks with authority,
or says what Plato believes. However, all readers have to come to terms with
the views expressed by his interlocutors.12 In some dialogues, more than one
insight or opinion is held in balance, in such away that it is never resolvedwhat
to do with them, asMiles Burnyeat argues is the case in the Theaetetus.13 Hans-
Georg Gadamer goes further: the dialogue form is innately open-ended or even
non-committal, or commits us to no more than carrying on thinking.14 Mary
Margaret McCabe remarks how varied the psychology of conversation in Plato
is: ‘Likewise, engaged on a conversation, we may find ourselves stepping out-
side the positionwe originally occupied and understanding a different point of
view’.15 Characters talk to each other, interrupt each other; they say what they
have been doing, they gossip, theymake plans for awalk, or indulge in idle rem-
iniscence. All of this makes a reader think and changes how she feels.
In the humanist revival of classical dialogue in quattrocento Italy, Plato is
always in mind, and Marsilio Ficino, especially, imitated his manner (as well
as translating him). However, Cicero was more heavily favoured as a technical
model for philosophical dialogue.16The fifth bookof De finibus is a primeexam-
ple. Cicero describes, there, attending a lecture in one of the academic schools,
and then taking ‘an afternoon stroll’withhis brotherQuintus, his cousinLucius,
and his friendTitus Pomponius.17While Cicero is not exactly renowned for cre-
ating convincing fictions of conversation,Malcolm Schofield argues that, more
thanPlato, he ‘gives properly argued alternatives a real run for theirmoney’.18 In
providing a formal role for arguments in utramque partem, representing even-
handedly both sides of a case, Cicero leaves debate open.19 This is the ethic of
debate Erasmus always admires most, as at the conclusion of De utilitate collo-
quiorum:
12 C. Gill, ‘Speaking up for Plato’s Interlocutors’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 20
(2001): 297–321.
13 M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving’, Classical Quarterly, 26 (1976): 29–51.
14 Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies of Plato, trans. P.C. Smith
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 88.
15 ‘Plato’s Ways of Writing’, Oxford Handbook of Plato, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008), p. 105.
16 David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 6.
17 Cicero, De finibus, 5.1.1.
18 Schofield, ‘Ciceronian Dialogue’, The End of Dialogue in Antiquity, ed. Simon Goldhill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 63.
19 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.3.9: ‘de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi’.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/05/2021 12:10:02PM
via free access
erasmus and the colloquial emotions 131
Erasmus Studies 40 (2020) 127–150
let us interpret fairly judgments that differ from our own, neither desiring
ours to be accepted instantly as oracles nor taking as oracles the judge-
ments of those who do not understand what they read.20
Jacques Chomarat has written the clearest exposition of the idea that Erasmus
uses the rhetorical resources of dialogue to achieve persuasive and argumen-
tative purposes.21 However, Erasmus also writes conversations where it is not
even clear why the interlocutors are talking at all, and whether they achieve
anything by the end. As is well known, in this he follows more the alternative
classical tradition of dialogue in Lucian.22 Along with Thomas More, Erasmus
produced a Latin translation of some of Lucian’s Greek dialogues in 1506.23
In France, ‘Lucianisme’ became the byword for the satirical style of François
Rabelais and Bonaventure des Périers. It is easy to see Erasmus’ interest in a
similar light. Lucian’s Charon or the Observers, for example, has Charon, the
ferryman of the dead, leaving hell for the upper world, to ask Hermes about
human affairs. Hermes describes what is spread out in a godlike view below
him, giving Charon ample opportunity for a mordant commentary on human
stupidity and corruption.
‘Rash vows’ in Erasmus (De votis temere susceptis), the first stand-alone dia-
logue in Johannes Froben’s March 1522 edition, begins in apparently similar
vein to Charon:
arnoldus:Where have you been wandering so long?
cornelius: In hell.
arnoldus: Not unlikely, since you’ve come back to us so dirty, thin, and
pale.24
Yet there is a kind of pointlessness to the meeting, in some contrast to Lucian’s
Charon.25 For all the world, Arnold and Cornelius are like Estragon and
Vladimir, at the beginning of Waiting for Godot. They have nothing to do, and
20 cwe 40: 1109.
21 Chomarat, Grammaire et rhétorique chez Érasme, 2 vols (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1981), 2:
877.
22 David Marsh, Lucian and the Latins: Humor and Humanism in the Early Renaissance (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 169–170.
23 Craig R. Thompson, ‘The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and Thomas More’, Revue
Belge de philologie et d’histoire, 19 (1940), 5–35.
24 cwe 39: 37.
25 In the March edition of 1529, Erasmus included a new dialogue called Charon.
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there is nothing to be done. ‘Rien à faire.’26 AlthoughCornelius recounts that he
is on the way back from a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, going back home is never so
purposeful as setting out for somewhere else. Arnold is franker: only folly has
driven him here, just as it has countless others. Cornelius’ new religious vow,
meanwhile, is merely to enjoy himself more in future. How so, asks Arnold;
giving a kind of Freudian answer in the form of a rhetorical question: An quia
iucundum est meminisse laborum actum?27 Is it ‘enjoyable to recall hardships
when they’re over and done with?’ Yes, in part, Cornelius answers, but adds
another advantage: he can tell lies about his travels. Arnoldus and Cornelius
share each other’s company in invented memory and in creating fictions of
themselves. Or perhaps they are just spending time together. At the end, they
agree to throw a party sometime else, to share more stories.
We could call this talk for the sake of talking. This throws open the nature of
the Colloquies to further discussion. Onemodel for dialogue, favoured byMon-
taigne, is progress through disagreement. This happens a lot in Plato. Opinions
differ, but we find the right one by listening to the opposite. An alternative view
is that conversation itself constructs a model for agreement. The interesting
point is that both models rely on a theory of emotion. Argument is not just
about a rational procedure; it is also about changing people’s feelings. Aris-
totle made this the foundation of his Rhetoric. An orator needs to persuade
people, and so he needs (it is always ‘he’ in Aristotle) to understand emotions,
both his own and those of his listeners.28 Encountering difference arouses
antipathy; soliciting agreement entails sympathy. Modern cognitive science
suggests a parallel pattern, mining dialogue analysis to detect emotional con-
tent. Indeed, dialogue has come to be a model not just for agreement, but
for the successful management of emotions altogether. Let’s talk, we say. Only
through talk are emotions understood, or perhaps even are comprehensible.
This is called ‘emotional recognition’, or erc: emotion recognition in conversa-
tion.29
While Aristotle’s Rhetoric came back to the fore only in the generation after
Erasmus, in the work of Francesco Robortello, he could have found a similar
intuition in Quintilian. In his discussion of figures as arguments, Quintilian
says that they have to be based on agreeable and ‘credible’ emotions.30 Con-
26 Samuel Beckett, En attendant Godot (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1952), p. 9.
27 asd i-3: 148.
28 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book iii, 1418a7–9.
29 Chul Min Lee and Shrikanth Narayanan, ‘Toward Detecting Emotions in Spoken Dialogs’.
ieee Transactions on Speech and Audio Processing. 13 (2): (March 2005). 293–303.
30 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 9.3.102.
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versation, Erasmus would surely recognise, is the place where we deal with our
emotions together.What is at issue in the Colloquies, then, may not be the con-
clusion we come to, but how we got there. What do we learn about each other
in the process, and howdowe feel now?Once again, Cicero is amodel to follow
here. In Book ii of the Tusculan Disputations, devoted to the problem of pain
after the death of his daughter Tullia in childbirth, he describes how his friends
leave off rhetorical exercises in the afternoons in order to engage in discussion
(disputationes). The effect, he says, is not so much intellectual enlightenment,
as that he felt delight and comfort from talking (delectatus vel potius adiutus).31
To convey this, Cicero abandons a narrativemode of analysis in order to record
the dialogue as if word-for-word, person to person.
Could it be that this is part of Erasmus’ aim in the Colloquies? At stake is
not only intellectual debate about issues of the time, but what we might now
call emotional intelligence about how to deal with them. The Colloquies set
in motion brief encounters between scores of characters. Many of them (like
Arnoldus andCornelius)may be based onErasmus’ friends or acquaintances.32
What matters is not whether this is ‘really’ Cornelis Gerard, one of his oldest
correspondents (fromhis time in the cloister at Steyn), but howErasmusmakes
him talk. Not all of Erasmus’ speakers are very good at it. They are churlish, or
short of words, or short of feelings. Others, though, many of them women, are
emotionally self-knowing. Some, who understand the emotions of others, are
not very good at their own, especially in the heat of themoment.Whatmatters,
finally, is notwhat they individually say, butwhat comesout in their colloquium,
the coming together of their conversation.Wemight call this, or the work itself,
a talking cure.
1 Rhetoric and Conversation
Rhetoric is the art of speaking as well as writing well. This is what makes it
so general a form of enquiry: it covers, Peter Mack observes, ‘the use of voice
and gesture, the ways to discover and present arguments, the arousal of emo-
tions, self-presentation, selections of vocabulary, the organization of a speech,
31 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.4.10.
32 Arnoldusmay refer to theArnoldus Bostius of Ep. 53. ACarmelite of Ghent, hewas a friend
of Cornelis Gerard, who could in turn be Cornelius. Gerard, an Augustinian canon from
Gouda, knew Erasmus by 1489 and probably much earlier; he is the author and recipient
of many letters, beginning with Ep. 17.
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patterning of words and sounds’.33 Once the grammatical elements have been
learned, Erasmus says inDeratione studii, pupils should ‘be encouraged toprac-
tise speaking right from the start’.34 In this he explicitly follows Quintilian.35
It is worth recalling here that, while the Colloquies have come to be read, like
Praise of Folly, as part of Erasmus’ experiment with fictional writing, they are
related much more to the rhetorical works. This is where he placed them in
his plans for an Opera omnia (in volume 1 rather than in volume 4).36 More-
over, as he recalls in his preface to the 1519 edition, the Colloquies began as an
exercise in parallel with De copia.37 Twenty years earlier, he refers to the exis-
tence of conversational exercises (sermones quosdam quotidianos) that he has
written for his students, which Augustin Vincent (Caminadus) has collected in
a manuscript.38 These scraps of dialogue are ‘such as we use on meeting each
other and at table’.39 Indeed, three letters survive of scraps like this, to pupils
such as Christian and Heinrich Northoff, who were lodging with Augustin in
1497.40 In a letter to Jacob Batt in 1500, Erasmus offers to revise the spoken sam-
ples and enclose them with a draft of De conscribendis epistolis.41 This work,
too, had a scrappy publishing history: Erasmus wrote a preface to a ‘method of
writing letters’ in 1498, although theworkwas only printed (unofficially) in 1521
before an ‘authorized’ edition by Froben in August 1522.42 At some level, Eras-
mus seems to have conceived of these two works as parallel elementary texts
in speaking and writing well. There is some cross-over of material in early edi-
tions.43 In any case, the description of the colloquies as formulae of conversa-
tion, ‘everyday’ or ‘familiar’, is retained from 1518 to 1522.Hebegins, indeed,with
a formula for meeting: ‘Greetings, father’; ‘dear little mother’; ‘my brother’.44
A colloquium in Cicero is not a natural conversation, but a performance in
imitation of the natural. Mark Antony is described in a letter to Atticus (writ-
ten just after the assassination of Caesar) as making a colloquium cumheroibus
33 Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380–1620, Oxford-Warburg Studies (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 2.
34 De ratione studii, cwe 24: 675.
35 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 1.1.11.
36 Franz Bierlaire, Érasme et ses colloques: le livre d’une vie (Geneva: Droz, 1977), p. 33.
37 Ep. 909 cwe line 19.
38 Ep. 130 to Jacob Batt, Allen lines 91–93.
39 Ep. 130 cwe line 109.
40 Epp. 54–56 to Christian Northoff.
41 Ep. 130 cwe lines 110–112.
42 Wallace Ferguson, Headnote to Ep. 71 in cwe 1: 146–147.
43 Thompson, ‘Introduction’, in cwe 39: xxiv.
44 cwe 39: 7.
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nostris (‘with our heroes’).45 In theTwelfth Philippic, a colloquium is equivalent
to a parley of the army, or even a political summit.46 What Erasmus means by
colloquium is more like what Cicero means by the word sermo—the speech of
everyday life, which Cicero often calls sermo communis. Of course, the printed
version is an imitation rather than the real thing: it is a written representation
of speech, but it harks back to the oratorical nature of rhetorical training. Sermo
is the ordinary Latin word for any kind of talk or speaking; however, it also cov-
ers literary conversation or discussion (similar to oratio). It can thus be high or
low; it can refer to a particular form of style, expression, or diction; it canmean
the language of a nation, but it can also refer to a single ‘word’. Indeed, the
most famous instance of it in Erasmus, and the cause of much controversy, is
whenheuses it in the 1519Novumtestamentum to translate (in place of Jerome’s
verbum) the first verse of the gospel of John: In principio erat sermo (‘In the
beginning was the word’).47
Sermo is also a familiar, but complex, word in literary theory. The pseudo-
Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, the oldest surviving Latin rhetorical trea-
tise, divides out three kinds of sermo (or ‘tones of voice’) to learn: first, speaking
with dignity, ‘with the calmest and most subdued voice possible’; second, a
‘demonstrative’ style, with ‘a rather thin-toned voice, and frequent pauses and
intermissions’, designed to implant in the hearer’s mind the points we aremak-
ing; lastly, a ‘narrative’ tone, in which ‘we seem to recount everything just as
it took place’.48 This will require rapid and vigorous intonation in some cases,
slower and leisurely in others. Even on such simple lines, sermo has to accom-
modate furthermodulations: ‘sharpness’, ‘kindness’, ‘sadness’, or ‘gaiety’. Adjust-
ment needs to be made to the emotion of the occasion; or alternatively, to
variations of jest: ‘shifting utterance smoothly’, from the serious to ‘facetious’,
with the hint of a smile, yet no laugh.
Sermo is a still subtler concept in Cicero’s authentic method. In the Ora-
tor, it is equivalent to an authorial style, such as when he praises Xenophon,
cuius sermo est ille quidemmelle dulcior, a voice sweeter than honey, one quite
removed from the wrangling of the forum.49 It can mean a person’s distinctive
mode of voice, as when Cicero in Brutus praises Laelia, the daughter of Gaius,
45 Cicero, Ep. xiv.6.1.
46 Cicero, Philippics, 12.11–12.
47 Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, Erasmus on Language andMethod inTheology (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 22.
48 Rhetorica ad Herennium, 3.14.24.
49 Cicero, Orator, 9.32.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/05/2021 12:10:02PM
via free access
136 cummings
Erasmus Studies 40 (2020) 127–150
for her careful usage (elegantia).50 In Brutus, it is also used as a synonym for
a dialogue, or to refer to discussion in the senate.51 In the dialogue between
Laelius and his sons-in-law, De amicitia, Cicero chooses sermo as a term to
reflect an author’s intention in rendering character, ‘to create the impression
that they are present and speaking in person’.52 It is a commitment of liv-
ing speech to memory, so that the actors are on stage before us. Its presence,
in a crucial context in this work on friendship, demonstrates that for Cicero,
sermo is associated with the representation of feeling as much as literary the-
ory; indeed, the two are hardly distinguishable. By rendering these speech acts,
Cicero aspires that the reader will believe that Laelius himself is talking. Dia-
logue thus acts as amimetic performance of friendship in action, so that ‘as you
read it you will recognize in it a portrait of yourself ’.53 Sermo is the rhetorical
performance of self, of emotion, of intersubjectivity.
From one of Erasmus’ earliest letters, to his brother Pieter in 1487, sermo
describes the familiar talk of friends. It is the language Erasmus shares with
his beloved Servatius, when they talk about Pieter together; it is equivalent to
a person’s thought-processes or even his dreams. Friendship and intimacy are
synonymous with it, as is summed up in the word familiares. This is the word
Erasmus uses in the title of the Colloquies, of course; it is the word Cicero used
for his ‘familiar letters’ to his friends (as did Petrarch, in turn).54 The connec-
tion Erasmus makes between familiar speech and friendship could hardly be
better expressed than in Cicero’s letter to Volumnius Eutrapelus in February
or March 50bce: iucundus est mihi sermo litterarum tuarum.55 ‘I enjoy the way
your letters talk.’ He might have mistaken the letter, addressed without a first
name, for one by the senator Volumnius, but something in the way that it is
written reveals his friend’s voice. The give-away is expressed by Cicero in a joke
in Greek, εὐτραπελία, which means ‘cultured insolence’, or outrageous wit; this
is his friend’s eponymous cognomen. Erasmus, who calls himself Desiderius,
knows the trick well. Indeed, he includes a Eutrapelus in two of his colloquies,
as well as various avatars of himself.56 Our words are as expressive of us as our
appearance or our very names.
50 Cicero, Brutus, lviii.211.
51 Cicero, Brutus, lx.218.
52 Cicero, De amicitia, 1.4.
53 Cicero, De amicitia, 1.5.
54 Kathy Eden, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2012), p. 49.
55 Cicero, Ep. vii.32.3.
56 In Ars notoria (‘The Art of Learning’), ‘Desiderius’ talks with ‘Erasmius’, apparently mod-
elled on Johannes Froben’s younger son. Various colloquies use the names ‘Erasmus’ and
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The place where these matters are discussed in formal rhetoric is in relation
to prosopopoeia. These are called by Quintilian fictiones personarum, which
are used to display the inner thoughts of opponents; to introduce conversa-
tions between ourselves and others; or ‘to provide appropriate characters for
words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity’.57 Some rhetoricians, he
says, distinguish prosopopoeia (where both speech and person are invented)
from sermocinatio, or διάλογος (in the Greek nomenclature), which consists of
imaginary conversations between historical characters. Quintilian rejects the
distinction on extremely interesting grounds: ‘for we cannot of course imagine
a speech except as the speech of a person’. Impersonation is an inevitable side-
product of speech-making. It can, of course, be done badly rather thanwell, yet
creating acts of speaking always conveys the imitation of a person as well as a
meaning or an idea. This is clearly a principle which Erasmus takes to heart
in the Colloquies. He deals with the theory in Book ii of De copia, where he
defines prosopopoeia as proxima personarum descriptio (‘the realistic presen-
tation of persons’).58 As well as stock delineations of stereotypes and generic
emotions, Erasmus here takes the time to admire more complex delineations
of character such as in Lucian’s Hippias. He also strays into drama, especially
several plays by Terence. Who could be more dissimilar, he asks, than Demea
and Micio in Adelphi, the two old brothers who educate their children in such
contrasting ways? ‘Micio is mild even when he is trying to reprimand his son
severely, Demea is cross-patched even when he is doing his best to be pleas-
ant.’59 Unlike Quintilian, Erasmus reserves a different term (‘prosopography’)
for delineatinghistorical characters.Thehighest form, he says, is dialogue itself:
‘in which we supply each person with utterances appropriate to his age, type,
country, way of life, cast of mind, and character’.60
2 Dialogue and Emotion
The humanist revival of ancient dialogue began in Italy in around 1400.61
Petrarch had previously written the Secretum, three books of dialogue between
‘Erasmius’, causing frequent confusion among early printers; see Thompson in cwe 40:
1120–1121.
57 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 9.2.31.
58 De copia, asd i-6: 206; cwe 24: 582.
59 cwe 24: 584.
60 cwe 24: 586.
61 Marsh, ‘Dialogue and discussion in the Renaissance’, The Cambridge History of Literary
Criticism, vol. 3, ed. Glyn P. Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 265.
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himself (‘Franciscus’) and ‘Augustinus’, but this had not been circulated in
his lifetime and shared some of the ambiguity about dialogue felt by Augus-
tine himself. Contra academicos, written in Cassiacum and the first of Augus-
tine’s works to be completed, indeed used the dialogue form to argue that
dialogue was inappropriate for the expression of Christianity, since certain
knowledge was, after all, attainable.62 Christianity in general sees a movement
by which, as Gillian Clark puts it, ‘sermo became sermon’, and conversation
became exposition or exhortation.63 This is despite the evident debt of Augus-
tine’s dialogues to Cicero; Augustine admires In Verrem even as he abjures its
method.64 Petrarch’s Secretum is as much Augustinian soliloquy as Ciceronian
dialogue. The pioneer in new form is the Florentine Leonardo Bruni. Dialogi
ad Petrum Histrum (1401–1406) represents Florentine notables debating the
virtues of Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch. A scholastic disputatio gives way to
polite exchange of viewpoints. A rather different approach is taken in Poggio
Bracciolini’s Facetiae, in which the conversation of learned men is exposed to
analysis, ridicule, and sometimes scandal.
In the early sixteenth century, Italian style in theCiceroniandialogue tended
towards the didactic.65 Everything changed with Baldassare Castiglione’s Il
Cortegiano (1528). While formally Ciceronian (modelled on De oratore), Cas-
tiglione’s characters aspire to a courtly virtue and grace quite removed from the
antique Roman urban constitution. The highest rhetorical art of the courtier is
sprezzatura, nonchalance and effortlessness.66 While most of Erasmus’ collo-
quies were written in the same decade as Castiglione, they have almost noth-
ing in common. Instead they hark back to the humanist quattrocento style of
Leon Battista Alberti. Della famiglia, written in the vernacular, uses dialogue
in the moulding of virtuous character; but Momus (c. 1450) is more varied,
at times melancholic or pessimistic in mood. It follows the Lucianic mode in
using the Homeric gods to provide models for human emotion.67 In this way
Momus shows a mixed attitude to human character, on display even more in
the earlier Intercenales (1439), ten books of dialogue in conscious imitation of
62 Augustine, Contra academicos, 2.9.22; csel, 63: 38–39.
63 Clark, ‘Canwe talk?Augustine and thepossibility of dialogue’, Endof Dialogue inAntiquity,
ed. Goldhill, p. 118.
64 Contra academicos is perhaps based on Cicero’s Academica; and De beata vita on Cicero’s
De finibus and Tusculan Disputations; see Clark, p. 118n.
65 Virginia Cox, The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in Its Social and Political Con-
texts, Castiglione to Galileo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 63–69.
66 Peter Burke, The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione’s Corte-
giano (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), p. 11.
67 Marsh, Lucian and the Latins, p. 77.
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Lucian. These ‘dinner pieces’ (to use Marsh’s translation) are personal as well
as satirical.68 ‘The Orphan’ deals with family litigation over inheritance; in ‘The
Love Affair’, a mother and daughter drive a young man to despair. In ‘The Hus-
band’, a virtuous husband punishes his unfaithful wife by gaslighting her with
silent shows of tolerance. In leading her to her death, the dialogue concludes
opaquely, the husband ‘combined severity with supreme indulgence’, a form of
black irony into which Alberti’s authorial persona completely disappears.69
Erasmus takes this mode further by removing any kind of narratorial inter-
vention. Characters speak for themselves, respond as themselves, and the
reader has to take them at their word. Dialogue, that is, becomes the sole
medium through which emotion is interpretable, as in a play, although here
outside drama. The section on emotion at the conclusion of De copia explains
how this happens. Any kind of argument, any kind of literature, even the expo-
sitionof facts, canbe enhancedby sermocinatio (‘dialogue’), ‘inwhichweassign
suitable utterances to one or more persons’.70 Erasmus cites a series of exam-
ples from the Iliad, in which Homer demonstrates wonderful skill in delineat-
ing ‘what is appropriate to each character’ through speech. Historians do this
frequently, and even Christian writers on occasion.71 An extended form may
be called epidiegesis, a term Erasmus uses rather differently from the rhetorical
tradition, to mean an expanded or repeated or digressive narration, ‘done to
rouse indignation or sympathy’. The reason for doing this, Erasmus says, is that
‘different people are affected by different things’ (quod alios aliamouent).72We
could add that people feel different things in the same circumstances.
Erasmus’ exposition of the experience of emotion, like many of the best
passages in De copia, itself comes upon us as a surprise aperçu, a thought or
remark in passing. This ushers forth a copious flow of examples of ‘warmth of
emotion’ from Cicero’s Pro Milone, which Cicero mixes in via conversational
example (deindemiscet affectus). Plato in The Republic is also apt in it, Erasmus
maintains, especially when he wants to get something across which a reader
might be reluctant to accept. This is the special skill of writers, who ‘handle
the various emotions at all the appropriate points’ (et affectuum omne genus
per omnes locos tractetur).73 Erasmus cites Aristotle and Quintilian here, with-
68 Alberti, Dinner Pieces: A Translation of the Intercenales, trans. David Marsh, Medieval &
Renaissance Texts & Studies, 45 (Binghamton, NY: Renaissance Society of America, 1987).
69 Alberti, Intercenales, trans. David Marsh, p. 133.
70 asd i-6: 272.
71 cwe 24: 649–650; Erasmus cites 2Maccabees 7, and Ambrose’s Life of St Agnes.
72 asd i-6: 272; cwe 24: 650.
73 asd i-6: 276; cwe 24: 654.
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out giving a reference; presumably he means the passage in Rhetoric, Book iii,
whereAristotle states: ‘The stylewill be appropriate if it expresses emotion and
character corresponding to the subject matter’.74 Aristotle evokes a distinction
between ᾖ παθητική τε καὶ ἠθικὴ, whichmakes Erasmus pause a little in his swift
exposition. The poets are wonderful at this, he says. However, instead of treat-
ing (as Aristotle does) πάθη as ‘emotion’ and ἤθη as ‘character’, Erasmus makes
them apply to different gradations of feeling. The former he calls vehemen-
tiores and the lattermoderatiores.While partly a question of degree—themore
‘passionate’ emotions are associated with anger or indignation—Erasmus also
makes the casual observation that these are found especially in the Iliad and
in tragedy, while the ‘calmer’ ones proliferate in the Odyssey and in comedy.75
This is because qui delectant potius quam perturbant—they please rather than
disturb.76
In what is by any standard a remarkable piece of literary criticism, Eras-
mus adds an extraordinary addendum that the ‘emotions of comedy’ (affectus
comicos) are often interspersed into the Iliad and into Greek tragedy as well,
although this is less often the case in Roman tragedy.Wemust, he says, include
pleasure in a theory of the emotions (Inter affectus autem ponenda delectatio).
To show what he means he makes an extended analysis of the passage in Iliad
6 when Hector departs for battle at the gates of Troy.77 Andromache carries
in her arms their infant son; Hector smiles without saying anything; Andro-
mache stands close to him, puts out her right hand, and calls him by name.
They mouth something to each other, but the boy Astyanax is terrified by his
father’s armour. Father and mother both laugh; Hector takes off his helmet,
puts it on the ground, and kisses the child. No one can get enough of Homer in
this mood, Erasmus says, showing his own delight in reading as he retells. He
confirms via Horace: thus ‘characters seem real’ (morata recte).78
While this is an idiosyncratic reading of ἤθη inAristotle, it canbemade sense
of, if we think of Erasmus as using it to define habitual behaviour rather than
extraordinary. This is, we might say, following Michel de Certeau, ‘the practice
of everyday life’.79 It is backed up by the account of ethos in Quintilian, which
Erasmus surely has specifically in mind. This is feeling which is ‘not only mild
and calm, but usually attractive and polite, and pleasing and delightful to the
74 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.7, 1408a10–11.
75 Erasmus uses Quintilian 6.2.20 and Longinus 9.15 on this point.
76 asd i-6: 276; cwe 24: 654.
77 Homer, Iliad, 6: 369–390.
78 Horace, Ars poetica, 319.
79 De Certeau, L’ Invention du quotidien (Paris: Gallimard, 1980).
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listeners’.80 This produces an expression of emotion almostwithoutmediation:
quomores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodammodoagnoscantur (‘so that
the speaker’s character shines throughhis speech and is somehowrecognized’).
This sentence is so perfectly resonant with Erasmus’ aim and execution in his
Familiaria colloquia that it might serve as its epigraph. Characters there recog-
nise each other’s feelings in the act of conversation, caught in the moment of
normal everyday situations, and the reader shares this process of emotional
recognition in the pleasure of reading. Take De captandis sacerdotiis (‘In Pur-
suit of Benefices’), another early colloquy, between Pamphagus (‘omnivorous’)
and Cocles (‘one-eyed’). The name Pamphagus is taken from one of Actaeon’s
hounds in Ovid’s Metamorphoses; it was later used also by Bonaventure des
Périers in his Lucianic dialogue Cymbalum mundi. Cocles is one of Erasmus’
nicknames for his scribe, Pieter Meghen.
The outward subject for the colloquy is Pamphagus’ need for a benefice to
keep him inmoney. ‘Amonkey without a tail is a priest without a benefice’ was
a Franciscan period joke.81 However, much of the conversation in Erasmus is
taken up with Cocles’ jokes about Pamphagus’ huge nose.82 It could be used
to extinguish a lamp; to collect things out of holes; as a peg, as a bellows, as a
shade from the sun, or as a shield in battle. Pamphagus is remarkably forebear-
ing at the onslaught: ‘Lucky me!’, he says, when he might be excused for losing
patience atwhat is presumably a sorepoint aswell as a very old gag.83Thepriest
andhis old drinking companion get along fine. Indeed, Pamphagus can laugh at
himself as well as give back in kind. Nihil est nisi nasus, he replies at one point;
you’re all wit/nose.84 They banter about priests and sex just as easily. Right at
the end of the exchange, however, they share some thoughts on humour itself.
Ludus in seria, says Cocles. ‘You take a serious matter lightly’, Thompson trans-
lates.Weare into theheart of Erasmian territory, and the thought could as easily
be reversed. Yet what is also at stake suddenly is how the two friends think
about each other. Are the jokes beginning to hurt?
pamphagus: You mock me and make fun of me. You treat me jokingly
in a matter that’s not funny at all.
cocles: I’m not laughing at you; I’m telling the simple truth. I don’t
joke; I’m telling you straight. I speak seriously, sincerely, plainly. I’m
telling the truth.
80 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 6.2.13.
81 A.J. Krailsheimer, Rabelais and the Franciscans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 66.
82 This nose’s vast afterlife extends from Cyrano de Bergerac to Tristram Shandy, 3.27–42.
83 Colloquies, cwe 39: 47.
84 asd i-3: 154.
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Pamphagus manages to relax and take it all in good sport. Cocles will never
stop playing the clown, Pamphagus says, and so he will not believe a word he
says, in return. They break off.
We could call themomentmetacolloquial.We are hardly going to trust Eras-
muswhen he has someone say: Serio loquor. Ex animo loquor. Simpliciter loquor.
Vera loquor. You must be kidding. Yet the passage also provides a commentary
on the section on emotion at the end of De copia. It is a reminder that Eras-
mus, for all his love of Euripides, makes all his own personal literary ventures
in comedy. He seeks, in Quintilian’s phrase, to write in a way that is amabile et
iucundum.85 It is worth remembering, too, that the passage on ethos in Quin-
tilian precedes the one on laughter.86 Comedy is the art of the everyday. Yet
literary theory has often been very poor at understanding the significance of
this, or at having anything moderately interesting to say about comedy. Freud,
some say, is an exception, and he certainly is one of the few writers who has
tried to understand the quick passage of feeling shown between Pamphagus
and Cocles here, between hostility and amiability.87 Yet comedy in the Collo-
quies should not be equated, as it sometimes is, with satire.Quam impia, quam
spurca, quam pestifera scripsit Pogius?88 So Erasmus wrote of Poggio’s irrever-
ent Facetiae in the letter to Dorp. Erasmus is interested as much in a different
kind of comedy, such as is evident in the quick slippage of emotion in conver-
sational exchange. Pamphagus and Cocles understand each other intuitively,
but that does not mean they are incapable of hurting each other. Emotion, it
turns out, is all about communication, but also about a lack of it.
3 Emotional Recognition in Erasmian Dialogue
Of the upwards of one hundred and twenty interlocutors in the Familiaria Col-
loquia, a dozen are women. The figure is not so remarkable, perhaps, until we
realise that in the whole classical tradition of dialogue, the only women char-
acters are Diotima in the Symposium, whose speech is merely reported, and
Lucian’s Dialogues of Courtesans. Virginia Cox has outlined in detail how the
incorporation of female speakers alongside male is one of the ‘great novelties’
85 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 6.2.13.
86 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 6.3.1.
87 Freud, Jokes and their Relation to theUnconscious (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976),
p. 143.
88 Ep. 337 Allen line 336. As ever, it is not clear whether Erasmus really disapproves of this.
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of Italian Renaissance dialogue.89 This is announced with a flourish by Pietro
Bembo’sGli Asolani (1505): in the preface to the third book, Bembo defends the
inclusion of female speakers in a philosophical dialogue, against those who
think this outside the ‘proper’ offices of the sex.90 Castiglione then included
Elisabetta Gonzaga, the duchess of Urbino, and her witty sister-in-law, Emilia
Pio, in Il Cortegiano. Typically, other women in Italian dialogues belong to a
court culture where female manners played a distinctive role; Battista Sforza
appears in a 1462 Latin dialogue by Martino Filetico. Another trend observed
by Cox is that of the 59 Italian dialogues she has found with female speakers,
two-thirds describe known historical figures.91 Erasmus is different. Although
editors have been keen to find the names of Erasmus’ characters among people
known from his life, they do not appear in the Colloquies as historical charac-
ters. Nor are they presented as types: they are invented fictional people with
their own individual ethos. It is interesting that Ortensio Lando, and Sperone
Speroni, who experimented with female characters outside of courtly soci-
ety, were reformist Erasmians. Later, women writers such as Chiara Matraini
(Dialoghi spirituali) freely presented a female religious superior instructing an
adolescent male.92
The August 1523 edition contains five colloquies on love, marriage, sexuality,
andwhatwemight loosely call feminism: ‘Courtship’, ‘TheGirl withNo Interest
in Marriage’, ‘The Repentant Girl’, ‘Marriage’, and ‘The YoungMan and the Har-
lot’. To these were added in later editions ‘The Abbot and the Learned Lady’
(1524), ‘The Epithalamium of Pieter Gillis’ (1524), ‘The New Mother’ (1526),
‘A Marriage in Name Only’ (1529), and ‘The Council of Women’ (1529). These
ten dialogues constitute what Thompson calls a ‘marriage group’, and Erika
Rummel, more robustly, ‘Erasmus on Women’.93 Such texts from a man who
was famously a monk, and never married, have caused comment. From here,
scholars have attempted to glean Erasmus’ own views, or those of Renaissance
humanism, on such topics. Rummel advises caution: different characters con-
tradict each other, and indeed sometimes themselves; Erasmus deliberately
allows them to repeat clichés, or outrageous views, or obvious non sequiturs.94
89 Cox, ‘The FemaleVoice in Italian Renaissance Dialogue’,mln 128 (2013): 53–78, this ref. 53.
90 Bembo, Prose e rime, ed. Carlo Dionisotti (Turin: utet, 1966), pp. 181–182.
91 Cox, ‘The Female Voice in Italian Renaissance Dialogue’, 54.
92 Janet Smarr, Joining the Conversation: Dialogues by RenaissanceWomen (Ann Arbor: U of
Michigan P, 2005).
93 Thompson, Headnote to ‘Courtship’ (Proci et puellae), in cwe 39: 256.
94 Rummel, Erasmus onWomen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 3–4.
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Even in his declamation Encomium matrimonii (1518), Erasmus disclaimed
responsibility for any views contained within.95
Rather than looking for an argument about marriage which Erasmus is try-
ing to inculcate, Reinier Leushuis suggests, we should see in the colloquies a
‘mimetic’ function, in which the reader is brought to amatrimonial ideal based
on intimacy and dialogue.96 Here I am interested not so much in marriage per
se, as in a model of intimacy expressed in dialogue itself. This is not so much
representative as constitutive. For, as cognitive philosophyhas been arguing for
awhile, conversation is not amimetic processing of emotions first experienced
elsewhere, but the place where emotion takes place. Several kinds of metanar-
rative thus emerge within a colloquy, such as: how far the fictional characters
have become people we believe in, or who believe in themselves, or in each
other? In so far as we are concerned with argument, it is also about how to
make arguments, or even what an argument is. All of this is part of the talking
cure.
In the case of themarriage colloquies, there is also an element of sexual play
involved in the argument. Proci et puellae is usually translated as ‘Courtship’,
which does not quite capture the frisson, in the Latin, of ‘wooers and girls’.
Pamphilus discusses with Maria the ethics of sex andmarriage; but Pamphilus
is also evidently in love with Maria. Maria, in turn, while not returning the
favour, enjoys flirting with him. Debating about love is a proxy form of sexual
tension, in which argument creates its own frictional excitement, in the way
Freud describes so well in his discussion of double entendre.97 This indeed is
how the dialogue opens, with a play onMaria’s own name, as a servant of Mars,
the god of war. You’re killing me, says Pamphilus, with the usual sexual associ-
ation. Maria replies with her own form of blood sport:
maria: Bona verba. Ubinam strages ista mortalium, quos ego occidi?
Ubi sanguis interfectorum?98
The double meaning of bona verba is as if to say, well said, but also watch what
you’re saying, or be careful what you wish for. Pamphilus replies he has turned
into a corpse, and wants Maria to bring him back to life. His name is taken
95 In Praise of Marriage, cwe 71: 91–92.
96 Leushuis, ‘The Mimesis of Marriage: Dialogue and Intimacy in Erasmus’s Matrimonial
Writings’, Renaissance Quarterly, 57 (2004), 1278–1307.
97 Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 75–76.
98 asd i-3: 277. ‘Mind what you’re saying. Where’s this heap of men I’ve slain? Where’s the
blood of the slaughtered?’, cwe 39: 258.
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from Terence’s Andria, where Pamphilus is caught between betrothed lovers,
and Erasmus begins this colloquy as if indeed in themiddle of a play. The char-
acters are already known to each other and to us, and by now the audience is
laughing at the talk of resurrected male bodies. Maria replies with a sub-sense
of blood rising to the genitals:
maria: Yet this pallor is streaked with lavender. You’re as pale as a ripen-
ing cherry or a purple grape.
The chafingnowquickly turns toneo-Platonism.Again, the role-playing is intri-
cate. Pamphilus is a student of philosophy, evidently, and struts his stuff with
plenty of references to Plato (from Phaedo, Philebus, and Phaedrus), and to
Ficino (from the commentary on the Symposium). Yet it is Maria who plays
Socrates, running rings round him while he shows off his knowledge. It is not
unlike, in its way, the treatment of Socrates by Alcibiades in Plato, where he
tells his master that he only likes to win the argument in order to get off with
the best-looking boys.99
maria: Dic tu, philosophe.100
Her questions show that she knows her theory of the soul, or of accidents or
properties, but she also insists on tormenting Pamphilus (‘Why do you sigh?
Speak freely’), while also teasing him to death with statements of the obvious
(‘Well, I’m a girl, not a stone’), which are yet reminders of the flesh. In the best
tradition of erotic arguments set in schoolrooms, every reference to the body
is a return of the repressed, even as the hapless lover tries to keep his mind on
higher things. It could beMaria versusMalvolio; indeed, it is perfectly plausible
that Shakespeare read this colloquy in Nicholas Leigh’s translation, A modest
meane to mariage (London, 1568).
What does speaking say? There is more to words, as J.L. Austin’s theory of
speech acts proclaims, than content alone, such as: ‘the fun of discovery, the
pleasures of co-operation, and the satisfaction of reaching agreement’.101 Pam-
philus andMaria yearn for satisfactory agreement in more ways than one. Like
at the end of a Shakespeare comedy, Maria’s final words are a put-down, or at
least they play for time. She will not marry him yet—it is traditional after all,
99 Plato, Symposium, 222E6.
100 asd i-3: 279. ‘You tell me, professor’ is Thompson’s nice translation, cwe 39: 259.
101 Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Philosophical Papers, 3rd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), p. 175.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/05/2021 12:10:02PM
via free access
146 cummings
Erasmus Studies 40 (2020) 127–150
for the man to propose—and she even wonders if it is best to leave marriages
to parental arrangement. She says this by means of a philosophical argument,
in keeping with the whole colloquy:
maria: But first ponder your own private decision. Judge by your rea-
son, not your feeling. What emotion decides is temporary; rational
choice generally pleases forever.
Quod affectus decernit, temporarium est.102 Like many statements in the collo-
quies, this can be taken in the opposite sense. In the final equation, as in Plato,
affectus must give way to ratio. However, it is also the case that the temporari-
ness of emotion, its fitness to the moment, is exactly what gives it force. Maria
speaks at two levels. She uses the voice of reason to deflect Pamphilus’ importu-
nate advances. Yet she remains the mistress of his emotions, by understanding
within the moment.
In an artful reply to the theologians in Paris who denounced several points
in this colloquy, Erasmus asked with which of the interlocutors, Pamphilus
or Maria, he is assumed to identify. The question is artful because, of course,
the theologians assume he identifies with the man. Yet while it appears that
Pamphilus argues for the superiority of sexual intercourse in marriage above
celibacy among priests, it is Maria who questions this.103 Erasmus claims
implicitly to side with her, even though she does so with decidedly mixed feel-
ings. Beyond this, Erasmusmakes another stance against the Paris theologians.
This is that the Colloquies are in any case a work of fiction.104 The statements
within it are not propositional but contingent and imaginative. In that sense,
they also belong to a world of emotion, in which agreement is made on differ-
ent grounds.
Yet this is not to say thatnothing really happens in fiction.TakeTerence’s play
Adelphi, to which Erasmus turns again and again, where the brothers Demea
andMicio are engaged in a fiction of parenthood, and inwhichAeschinus engi-
neers his own feelings to help his brother Ctesipho. This does not diminish
what is at stake in the feelings between them. In the midst of mutual decep-
tion, Micio’s declaration that he loves Aeschinus like a father, even though we
know he is not his father, is nevertheless real: nam te amo, quo magis quae agis
curae sunt mihi (‘I love you, and so I care all the more about what you do’).105
102 asd i-3: 287; cwe 39: 267.
103 See Thompson in cwe 39: 276.
104 Erasmus, Declarationes ad censuras Lutetiae vulgatas, lb 9: 9370.
105 Terence, The Brothers, 680.
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Erasmus’Philodoxus (‘The Lover of Glory’), probes the experience of emotions
in plays. Erasmus makes the eponymous interlocutor Philodoxus confess:
philodoxus: Non sum Stoicus ἀπαθής: tangor humanis affectibus.106
‘I’m not a dispassionate Stoic, I am subject to human feelings.’ Yet how to read
his own feelings, never mind those of others? The case of Demea in Adelphi,
says his friend Symbulus, shows how changeable emotions are. Everyone is
different: est singulis in vno quoque genere peculiare quoddam ingenium (‘each
individual in any one group has some particular characteristic’).107 So, do you
wantme to act like the changeable polypum, asks Philodoxus, ever aware of his
honour? In Adagia, this is indeed Erasmus’ recommendation: human nature
should be adaptable, like the octopus that changes colour according to habi-
tat.108 We remain true to ourselves, while accommodating ourselves to every
new circumstance. This is what it means to be subject to humanis affectibus.
Reading emotions, according to Erasmus, is precisely the art of rhetoric. As
Cicero remarks in Brutus: ‘what skill the orator has in playing on the minds
of his audience is recognized by the emotion produced’.109 The intelligence of
emotions is immediate, like the sound made by the harp when the string is
struck. A good critic can tell a good orator via a single glance, without even
hearing a word. Indeed, in ‘A Feast of Many Courses’, Erasmus describes how
emotions can be readwithoutwords, throughmimeor gesture. Awoman easily
knows what her husband is feeling, without asking.110 In Amicitia (‘Friend-
ship’), the ‘sympathy’ between Sir Thomas More and his monkey is recounted,
proving that animals, too, feel emotions. In themeadowor in the stable, a horse
will seek out always the same companion, when it has nothing to dowith sex.111
Many theories of emotion and language, like other theories of language, are
based on a model of communication.112 I have a feeling, which I try to com-
municate in words, perhaps in direct response to your entreaty: ‘Tell me what
you are feeling’. Yet we are also familiar with situations in which words, more
than anything, are awkward to find in relation to the complexity of emotion.
Perhaps this is especially true of difficult or negative or conflicted emotions.
106 asd i-3: 669; cwe 40: 966.
107 asd i-3: 673; cwe 40: 970.
108 Adagia, i i 93.
109 Cicero, Brutus, liv.200.
110 cwe 40: 806.
111 cwe 40: 1045.
112 LauraK.Guerrero, PeterA. Andersen andMelanie R.Trost, ‘Communication and emotion’,
Handbook of Communication and Emotion (New York: Elsevier Press, 1996), pp. 3–27.
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Martha Nussbaum argues in Anger and Forgiveness that intimate relationships
are pivotal in this, because of ‘people’s sense of what it is for their lives to go
well’.113 The desire to talk may exceed the ability (I only know that I am feeling
something strongly, not what I am feeling precisely). It is also commonplace
to say that it is only in the act of talking that we come to know what we feel.
In that sense, language is a premonition of feeling, or at least the understand-
ing of feeling: it does not yet have something to communicate. Anger, upset, or
distress, inhibits self-knowledge.
Erasmus is more sensitive to these areas than we might think. He explicitly
discusses tragedy in De copia as the place where emotions that are vehemen-
tiores (like anger or resentment) are on display. Yet he also suggests that every-
day emotions (moderatiores) also need careful handling and nurturing. To this
end, in theColloquies, he often chooses his interlocutors precisely because they
are not alike, or do not agree, or are actively in conflict with each other. Presen-
tation of emotion in philosophical discussion often assumes self-knowledge.
Yet not everyone is as self-knowing asMaria in Proci et puellae. Catarina, in ‘The
Girl with No Interest in Marriage’, argues against sex, but she does so without
understandingwhat sex is. Xanthippe inConiugum (‘Marriage’) is not as intelli-
gent as Maria, but she is clearly smarter than her husband. Fabulla in Puerpera
(‘The New Mother’) perhaps shows a different trait, so that even in arguing
difficult philosophical problems (freedom and divine justice), emotional intel-
ligence outwits rational knowledge. Eutrapelus, that inveteratemansplainer—
his name synonymous with wit—cannot see it for the life of him.
Women are often said to be better at handling emotions, as also at talking
about them, than men. Perhaps Erasmus agrees, but if so, he also knows that
most conversations inevitably takeplacebetweenpeople of unequal emotional
intelligence. In these situations, it is as hard to be the personwho is expected to
be good at talking, as the one who is not. Perhaps there is no better example of
this in Erasmus than Magdalia’s encounter with Antronius in Abbatis et erudi-
tae (‘The Abbot and the LearnedWoman’). If Magdalia is often associated with
More’s daughter, Margaret Roper, Antronius has a lower reputation. Antronius
asinuswas proverbial for someone exceptionally gross and stupid.114 He is a fat
abbot, not much of an academic. Editors, academics themselves, assume that
we are not supposed to like him. Yet it is not so clear that Magdalia is in such
company. Antronius plays, perhaps, at being a fun-loving Philistine; whileMag-
dalia plays at beinghis Socrates, bringinghimup to scratch.Yet in this supposed
113 Martha C. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 93–94.
114 Adagia, ii v 68.
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dialogue of the deaf, between an unmarried man and a married woman, one
cloistered and the other not, there is nonetheless an unconscious rapport, so
that they can virtually finish each other’s thoughts. It is a miraculous example
of Erasmus’ facility for dialogue in action, grounded in the stylistic device of
stichomythia, much used by his beloved Euripides, yet here in virtuoso pairs or
trios of words:
antronius: I haven’t the leisure.
magdalia: How come?
antronius: Because I’ve no free time.
magdalia: No free time to grow wise?
antronius: No.
magdalia: What hinders you?115
Magdalia tries to persuade Antronius of her own love for books; Antronius
replies that books drive himmad.What book-lover would not agree, to a point?
He prefers his wine, but while Magdalia loves to scold him about that, it is not
clear that she dislikes him, quite the contrary. The apparent empathy between
these unlike souls is captured beautifully by an elegant example of Erasmian
use of figures of speech. Magdalia employs the device of interruptio on Antro-
nius:
antronius: If wisdom came without hard work—
magdalia: But man gets nothing in this life without hard work.116
Aposiopesis in Rhetorica adHerennium is defined as ‘to begin to say something
and then stop short’.117 It is a form of emphasis, by leaving something obvious
unsaid. Quintilian reserves it for an ‘interruption’ proper (citing Cicero’s term,
reticentia) in order to showemotion, especially anger or anxiety.118YetMagdalia
employs it instead to show understanding in the very moment of recognition.
She finishes Antronius’ sentence for him, although not quite in the way that he
wanted. She understands him, we could say, better than he does himself. On
the same page she then interrupts herself, yet not out of exasperation, or even
in Ciceronian ‘reticence’, but because her thought is catching up with her own
feeling. Conversation is like that in Erasmus. It is a way of reconciling tensions,
115 asd i-3: 404; cwe 40: 502.
116 asd i-3: 406; cwe 40: 504.
117 Rhetorica ad Herennium, 4.54.68.
118 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 9.2.54.
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or at least of understanding thembetter. However, even if a conversation of this
kind only reveals that there is disagreement, progress of a kind has beenmade:
difference has been communicated, as well as argument registered. Emotional
intelligence, in his time as in ours, is perhaps less common than we would like
to think. But we will only get there by talking.
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